University of Miami Business Law Review
Volume 29

Issue 2

Article 3

The OCC FinTech Charter and the Bank Holding Company Act
Lauren Bomberger
American University Washington College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lauren Bomberger, The OCC FinTech Charter and the Bank Holding Company Act, 29 U. MIA Bus. L. Rev. 1
()
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr/vol29/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Business Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please
contact library@law.miami.edu.



The OCC FinTech Charter and the Bank
Holding Company Act
Lauren Bomberger*
Abstract
The definition of a bank under the Bank Holding Company Act of
 *  +$ $'#%$$ %$%%&%($
first enacted. Congress has identified a number of underlying
rationales for applying the BHCA to certain entities thus
necessitating a change in the definition. Recent innovations in
technology, however, have made it challenging to adapt the U.S.
financial regulatory regime to these advances, particularly for the
   % !!) *  +  &$%#)   ! %
Comptrolle#!% &## ),$* +  #%#$! 
example of an attempt by a U.S. financial regulator to grapple
with emerging technologies in financial services in a meaningful
way. Despite the OCC initially suggesting that the BHCA could
apply to FinTech companies chartered as special purpose
%!  $* $+%$ %%$! !%  !%%
the definition of a bank under the BHCA because FinTech SPNBs
are not permitted to take deposits. This Comment sets out a
framework by which to analyze whether the definition of a bank
under the BHCA should include FinTech firms who make loans
and do not take deposits, i.e. *#%"  #$+ $
Comment finds that including FinTech firms, specifically
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marketplace lenders, in the statutory definition of a bank would
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I. INTRODUCTION
From mobile banking and artificial intelligence to Big Tech,
technology is changing the way financial services are reaching consumers,
and U.S. financial regulators are struggling to keep pace. In 2016, the U.S.
 ! % !"%#!# ! % &## ) *+ %%"ted to bring
financial innovations under the federal regulatory regime by announcing
%  ),$ ("!#%!   %! $" "&#"!$ %!    * +
#%#$ !#    % !!) *  + !" $1 The agency
proceeded with its proposal in 2018, announcing it would begin accepting
""%! $!#$&#%#$"&$  &"%%!%!"%#!#,$
Licensing Manual in July 2018.2
1

See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE
NATIONAL
BANK
CHARTERS
FOR
FINTECH
COMPANIES
2
(2016),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/responsibleinnovation/comments/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-charters-fintech.pdf (introducing the
idea of a FinTech charter).
2
See generally OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER,S
LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, CONSIDERING CHARTER APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL
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The July 2018 Licensing Manual Supplement made clear that the only
FinTech companies who could apply for the charter were those who did
not take deposits.3 # #  *" %#  ! ! !  
"$"####   & #  (  )$
apply to companies that own FinTech SPNBs if the SPNB meets the
definition of a bank under the statute.4 However, in order to meet the
definition of a bank under the BHCA, the institution must either be (1)
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), or (2) take
deposits and make commercial loans.5 $"  #  *" %
requirement that depository institutions cannot apply for the FinTech
charter, parent companies of FinTech SPNBs would be, by definition,
excluded from application of the BHCA.6
To demonstrate this issue, imagine a hypothetical FinTech company:
a marketplace lender, FastCash, Inc. FastCash is a large direct lender that
relies on market funding to make loans to its customers via its online
website. Customers need only fill out an application online before
receiving a credit decision, which FastCash makes using its proprietary
underwriting algorithm. FastCash only makes consumer loans; that is,
extensions of credit to a person rather than a business. To avoid the costly
and burdensome state-by-state licensing system, FastCash applies for and
receives an SPNB charter, thus entitling it to all the rights and benefits of
a federally-regulated national bank.
Imagine, also, a large technology and e-commerce company'
Abracadabra, Inc.'which offers a variety of services in addition to its ecommerce platform, including big data analytics.7 To facilitate its e-

TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES
(2018),
https://www.occ.gov/publications-andresources/publications/comptrollers-licensing-manual/files/pub-considering-charter-appsfrom-fin-tech-co.pdf (establishing that FinTech companies may be eligible for a national
bank charter and explaining how FinTech charter applications might be evaluated).
3
See id. at 1 ((This document describes the key factors the OCC will consider in
evaluating charter applications from fintech companies that . . . do not take deposits . . . )).
4
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 7 ((If a fintech
company interested in operating as a special purpose national bank has or plans to have a
holding company that would be the sole or controlling owner of the bank . . . the BHCA
could apply.)).
5
See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (providing the seminal definition of a bank under the
BHCA as an institution that is either FDIC-insured or both accepts deposits and makes
commercial loans).
6
See Elizabeth J. Upton, Chartering Fintech: The OCCs Newest Nonbank Proposal,
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1393, 1426 (2018) (arguing the OCC should not be allowed to
charter non-depository institutions because doing so would enable parent companies of
such institutions to avoid the BHCA).
7
The interest of Big Tech in expanding into financial services is well documented. See
generally Dan Murphy, Big Techs Invasion of Banking, MILKEN INST. (Apr. 26, 2019),
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commerce business and make use of its data analytics arm, Abracadabra
seeks to acquire FastCash to offer lending services to its customers.
FastCash is not a bank for the purposes of the BHCA because it neither
accepts deposits nor is FDIC-insured. Abracadabra can thus obtain the
benefits of a nationally-chartered entity without being subject to the
BHCA.
The history of the BHCA tracks a game of cat-and-mouse, in which
industry players construct innovative business models to avoid triggering
the statute, while Congress attempts to undercut opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage by amending the statutory text.8 If there is a loophole
in the OCC FinTech charter that undermines the underlying policy
objectives of the BHCA, then undoubtedly FinTech SPNBs should also be
                  9 If,
however, applying the BHCA to the parent companies of FinTech SPNBs
would not serve any underlying policy objective, then there is no legal
conundrum.10 Ultimately, whether the BHCA should apply to the parent
companies of FinTech SPNBs is a question of the extent to which it would
       
The question that this Comment seeks to answer is: should the BHCA
apply to the parent companies of FinTech SPNBs? Through the lens of the
marketplace lending industry, this Comment argues that subjecting the
parent companies of FinTech SPNBs to the BHCA would serve the
             , the BHCA should
apply. This Comment also proposes a framework by which to analyze the
applicability of the BHCA. Part II of this Comment provides an
introduction to the OCC FinTech charter, the marketplace lending
industry, and the BHCA. Part III proposes a framework to analyze the
                
marketplace lender, FastCash. Part IV recommends a solution in the form
of a statutory amendment from Congress that would incorporate FinTech
SPNBs into the definition of a bank under the BHCA.

https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/big-techs-invasion-of-banking (discussing the
threat of Big Tech companies seeking to enter the financial services industry).
8
See generally Saule T. Omarova & Tahyar E. Margaret, That Which We Call a Bank:
Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulations in the United States, 31 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2012) (providing a detailed history of the development of the
BHCA and the changing definition of a bank as a result of the industry exploiting
loopholes).
9
Cf. id. at 15968 (exemplifying how an exemption from the BHCA precipitated the
rapid growth of the industrial loan company industry).
10
See id. at 172 (explaining that credit card banks were first implicitly, and then
explicitly, exempted from the definition of a bank under the BHCA because there was no
interstate banking risk or monopolization of commercial credit risk).
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II. THE FINTECH CHARTER AND THE BHCA
FinTech is difficult to define as there is no universally-accepted
definition.11 Merriam-        
and companies that employ newly developed digital and online
            12 The types
of technologies are broad and include products such as marketplace
lending, mobile banking, mobile payments, crowdfunding,
cryptocurrency, automated investing, and other digitized assets and
services.13 The rise of FinTech, particularly marketplace lending,
accelerated following the financial crisis of 2008, when access to lines of
credit dried up and made it exceedingly difficult for consumers and small
businesses to obtain short-term, small-dollar loans.14 Consequently, the
FinTech industry is generally seen as a product of the growing 21stcentury digital economy, and a new challenge for financial regulators
tasked with ensuring the safety and soundness of the markets and their
participants.15 In 2018, the OCC attempted to provide greater regulatory
clarity for FinTech companies that pay checks or make loans, but do not
take deposits, in the form of a proposed FinTech charter.16

A. Introducing the OCC FinTech Charter
The OCC FinTech charter was the result of a long-term multistakeholder effort beginning in August 2015 to study financial innovation
and develop an appropriate regulatory framework.17 In March 2016, the
11

See, e.g., Christopher G. Bradley, FinTechs Double Edges, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 61,
7879 (2018) (advocating for a broad definition of financial technology).
12
Fintech,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/fintech (last visited May 25, 2021).
13
See, e.g., JACKSON MUELLER, MILKEN INSTITUTE, BIPARTISAN OPPORTUNITIES TO
LEGISLATE
U.S.
FINTECH
IN
THE
21ST
CENTURY
9
(2018),
https://milkeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/reports-pdf/FINAL-FinTech-BipartisanLegislation2.pdf (tabulating the various sectors of the financial technology industry).
14
See DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44614, MARKETPLACE LENDING:
FINTECH IN CONSUMER AND SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING 1 (2018) (discussing the rapid
growth of the marketplace lending industry); see also Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav,
Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 268 (analyzing how online
lenders have filled the gaps in access to credit).
15
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing FinTech as a new development in market
trends); id. at 16 (noting FinTech presents regulatory challenges).
16
See Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Begins Accepting
National Bank Charter Applications From Financial Technology Companies (July 31,
2018),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html
(announcing the agency would begin accepting applications for national bank charters from
FinTech companies).
17
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 3 (summarizing
the progress of the OCCs innovation initiative).
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agency capitalized on its work by publishing its first white paper on the
principles of regulating financial innovation.18 A few months later, the
OCC established the Office of Innovation and, not long after, announced
in December 2016 that it would begin exploring SPNB charters for
!$" ",# #
%
FinTech companies.19  $
%!!$$(# #*$ $$#
in a limited range of banking or fiduciary activities . . . +20 In the case of
the FinTech charter, these activities are limited to paying checks or lending
money.21
According to the OCC, an SPNB charter for FinTech would: (1)
*!" &"' " % "#$"#+*&$!(
'$ "%$ #$$%$ #+   *! !"  $  ##$(  $
application of laws and regulations across the country . . . +22 The FinTech
charter provides a nationalized solution to the current state-by-state
licensing system.23 The present regulatory framework can be quite
burdensome for FinTech companies, particularly marketplace lenders,
who are required to comply with the varying, and sometimes conflicting,
state licensing requirements.24 The OCC aimed to provide greater certainty
and clarity for the industry through the creation of FinTech SPNBs that
have the same rights and requirements as national banks.25 According to
the OCC, a FinTech company chartered as an SPNB has the same rights
as any other chartered national bank.26 This special status affords SPNBs
18

See id. (highlighting the white paper released in March 2016 in which the OCC
discussed the regulation of financial innovation).
19
See id. at 2)3 (summarizing the agency,s findings and discussing the establishment
of the OCC,s Office of Innovation); Press Release, Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency,
OCC To Consider Fintech Charter Applications, Seeks Comment (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-152.html.
20
OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 2, at 2.
21
See id. (defining the core banking functions of SPNBs); see also 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.20(e)(1) (2021) (*A special purpose bank that conducts activities other than fiduciary
activities must conduct at least one of the following three core banking functions:
Receiving deposits; paying checks; or lending money.+).
22
OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES, ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS 2
(2018),
https://www.ots.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/pub-other-occpolicy-statement-fintech.pdf.
23
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining how FinTech companies are regulated
at the state level).
24
See id. at 15 (discussing the various state licensing requirements and which companies
or industries are required to obtain licenses).
25
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5 (*In general, a
special purpose national bank is subject to the same laws, regulations, examination,
reporting requirements, and ongoing supervision as other national banks.+).
26
See id. (describing further the benefits that a FinTech SPNB can obtain by virtue of
becoming a chartered national bank).
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certain benefits, notably federal preemption under the National Bank Act
 ' 27
The OCC FinTech charter has been caught up in litigation since 2016,
"  !%  & " 
    ! %  &   " 
challenging the charter.28 While the CSBS case was dismissed for lack of
ripeness, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
entered judgment in October 2019 in favor of NYDFS, effectively
blocking the OCC from issuing any charters to FinTech companies.29 The
OCC appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and, as
of May 2021, the parties are awaiting a decision.30 Nonetheless, interest in
the FinTech charter remains high, particularly among the industry that
would stand to benefit the most from a national regulatory regime:
marketplace lenders.31

B. Marketplace Lending
In simple terms, a marketplace lender is a non-banking entity that
makes loans to consumers and businesses via an online platform.32
Customers apply for ##!'"
provide access to their bank and other accounts, and receive a credit
27

See id. (discussing the dual-banking preemption system).
See Complaint at 5, Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d
285 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17 Civ. 0763) (brining a suit against the OCC for declaratory and
injunctive relief, preventing the OCC from chartering FinTech companies); see also
Complaint at 1, Vullo v. OCC, No. 17 Civ. 3574, 2017 WL 6512245, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 2017) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and challenging the OCC SPNB charter
for FinTech companies).
29
See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. OCC, No. 18 Civ. 2449, 2019 WL
4194541, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2019) (dismissing the case for lack of ripeness); see also
Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019)
(vacating the OCC's regulation permitting it to charter non-depository institutions).
30
See Notice of Appeal, Lacewell, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895, at *1
(appealing the decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York);
see also Lacewell v. OCC, No. 19-04271 (2d Cir. filed Dec. 19, 2019) (filing the appeal
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
31
See Kate Rooney, Fintechs Fast Pass to Traditional Banking is Now Cut Off, CNBC
(Oct. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/24/fintechs-fast-pass-totraditional-banking-is-now-cut-off.html (pointing out that FinTech companies were very
interested in the OCC charter). But see Zach A. Pette, Its Harder for Fintechs to Become
Banks. And Thats Good., PAYMENTSSOURCE (Mar. 26, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.paymentssource.com/opinion/its-harder-for-fintechs-to-become-banks-andthats-good (arguing against a national bank charter for FinTech companies but noting many
companies, including Varo and Square, are eager to obtain the benefits of a national bank
charter).
32
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 1$2 (describing the central features of marketplace
lenders).
28
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decision almost immediately.33 The process is expedited through the use
of machine learning and artificial intelligence to assess alternative,
nontraditional data, enabling the program to generate a credit decision
within minutes.34           
lenders particularly accessible to unbanked and underbanked customers
who are often unable to obtain credit from chartered institutions that use
more traditional data.35 The growth of the industry is further evidence of
the popularity of marketplace lenders, who saw a global increase in credit
originations from $11 billion in 2013 to $284 billion in 2016.36 In 2019,
two of the largest industry players in the United States, LendingClub and
OnDeck, originated almost $15 billion in loans combined.37
There are two primary business models by which the marketplace
lender can extend credit: (1) the direct lending model; and (2) the bank
partnership model.38 Under either model, the marketplace lender does not
take deposits and instead relies on the market or its bank partner to fund
the loan.39 In the direct lending model, the marketplace lender holds the
loans on its balance sheet and incurs all the credit risk if a borrower
defaults.40 Direct marketplace lenders generally have to obtain a license
for every state in which they want to do business, which can discourage
companies from pursuing the direct lending model.41
In the bank partnership model, the marketplace lender relies on a stateor nationally-chartered bank to originate the loan, which the marketplace
33

See How Do I Get a Loan?, LENDINGCLUB, https://help.lendingclub.com/hc/enus/articles/214496857 (last visited May 25, 2021) (detailing the steps for securing credit);
see also HOW IT WORKS, ONDECK, https://www.ondeck.com/how-it-works (last visited
Apr. 12, 2020) (summarizing OnDecks credit application process for potential customers).
34
See Kristin Johnson et al., Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in
Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 50005 (2019)
(explaining how FinTech lenders use machine learning and artificial intelligence).
35
See id. at 528 (discussing the benefits of artificial intelligence).
36
Stijn Claessens et al., Fintech Credit Markets Around the World: Size, Drivers and
Policy Issues, 2018 BIS Q. REV. 29, 33.
37
See LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 58 (Feb. 19, 2020) (reporting
$12.3 billion in loan originations in 2019); see also On Deck Cap., Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 28, 2020) (reporting $2.5 billion in loan originations in 2019).
38
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 23 (describing the marketplace lending business
models and noting that the direct lending model is also referred to as the balance-sheet
lending model); see also U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT
CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND
INNOVATION 8788 (2018) (discussing the lending models).
39
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 11 (noting marketplace lenders do not rely on
deposits).
40
See id. at 3 (describing the direct lending model, which is also referred to as the
balance-sheet lending model).
41
See U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, supra note 38, at 8788 (discussing the direct
lending model).
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lender then buys back and services for the borrower.42 Another version of
          -to- !  !     
prospective investors with loans that match their risk tolerance and desired
rate of return.43 Once a match is made and the investor has committed to
funding the loan, the partner bank originates the loan and sells it to the
marketplace lender, who in turn sells the loan to investors in the form of a
note.44
             -a-   !
  -a- !   
           
bank to originate the loan and, in exchange, obtains the same legal
protections and preemption benefits afforded to that institution for that
loan.45 This model can be particularly beneficial for a marketplace lender
seeking to avoid state usury caps because, under Marquette National Bank
of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,46 the loan originated by
the partner bank is valid so long as it complies with the usury laws of the
state in which the bank is located. However, a Second Circuit decision
from 2015 eviscerated this arrangement by holding that third-party debt
buyers cannot avail thems      "   
of state usury caps.47            -a-   !
           "          
appealing.48

42

See id. at 88 (discussing the bank partnership model); see also PERKINS, supra note
14, at 3 (explaining how the bank partnership model functions).
43
See U.S. DEP"T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 38, at 88 (discussing the P2P lending
model); see also PERKINS, supra note 14, at 4 (illustrating the P2P lending model).
44
See U.S. DEP"T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 38, at 88 (detailing the funding strategy
in the P2P funding model); see also PERKINS, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining the
securitization process in the P2P lending model, also referred to as the indirect funding
model).
45
See, e.g., PERKINS, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining the legal challenges that rent-acharter schemes face, particularly when considering who the true lender is).
46
439 U.S. 299, 313 (1978) (holding that a bank may charge its out-of-state customers
the interest rate that is permitted in the state where the bank is located).
47
See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that third-party debt buyer partners of national banks cannot preempt state usury caps under
the National Bank Act).
48
See Joseph B. Sconyers et al., OCC Fintech Charter Headed to the Second
Circuit, JONES DAY (Jan. 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/01/occfintech-charter-headed-to-the-second-circuit (contending that the Second Circuit"s
decision in Madden v. Midland raised existential questions! for FinTech companies and
made the prospect of a national bank charter more appealing).
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C. The Bank Holding Company Act: A History of a Statute Under
Siege
The BHCA regulates the parent companies of entities that meet the
definition of a bank under the statute.49 These bank holding companies
+ $, # $&% %   #&%   $&!#'$  ) %
#$#' #  '# #$+ #,50 Specifically, there are a
number of requirements that a company must meet before becoming a
BHC, such as requesting pre-approval by the Board before acquiring any
bank or any additional bank.51 The Board also restricts the permissible
activities of the non-$&$#$  $% % $%%#+$ 
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto . . . ,52
The BHCA was initially enacted for two primary and interrelated
purposes: (1) to prevent the monopolization of commercial credit; and (2)
to restrict the interstate expansion of bank branches.53 The enactment of
the groundbreaking legislation was the result of an uptick in banks forming
BHCs as a means to subvert state banking regulations restricting interstate
branching.54 The drafters of the BHCA feared this trend would lead to the
#$ +% !#,55  %$$  (% -$
passage in 1956, the policy focus shifted from the two above rationales to
the separation of banking and commerce, reflecting concerns about banks
becoming too immersed in non-banking activities.56 The three policies for
the BHCA that Congress put forth can be summarized as: (1) restricting
interstate banking; (2) preventing the monopolization of commercial
credit; and (3) separating banking and commerce.

 ' ' %  +,#% 
Whether an entity qualifies as a bank under the BHCA determines the
$%%&%-$!!%) !)%%"&#$ %%)(l not
49

12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
Id. § 1844 (requiring BHCs to register with the Board and authorizing the Board to
regulate BHCs).
51
Id. §§ 1842(a), 1843(j)(1), (4)*(5).
52
12 C.F.R. § 225.28(a) (2021).
53
See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 2*7 (1955) (outlining the reasons for the BHCA,
including combatting the growing number of BHCs seeking to take advantage of out-ofstate markets); see also Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 119 (summarizing the two
underlying rationales for the BHCA).
54
See H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 4 (detailing the expansion of BHCs across state lines).
55
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 120 (citing Note, The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 75 BANKING L.J. 277, 293 (1958)).
56
See id. at 124 (demonstrating the shift in focus to the separation of banking and
commerce).
50
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be subject to the requirements of the BHCA or heightened regulation by
the Board.57 The definition of a bank under the BHCA is the product of
numerous amendments between 1956, when the statute was enacted, and
1987, when the definition of a bank was most recently amended.58
Congress acknowledged that the BHCA as originally enacted was not
intended to contemplate all the issues and risks posed by BHCs. 59 Yet,
because the statute was not comprehensive, this gave rise to loopholes. 60
 "   
the statute, there was a corresponding increase in institutions seeking to
take advantage of newly-created loopholes.61
            
institution that accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right to
withdraw on demand . . .  62 Congress narrowed the original 1956
definition63 realizing that restricting the application of the BHCA to
depository institutions could still serve the underlying objective of
restraining the concentration of commercial credit.64 Congress viewed it
as unnecessary to apply the BHCA to companies that owned savings banks
and thus applied the statute only to institutions that accepted demand
deposits.65 However, the 1966 Amendments enabled holding companies
to sidestep the requirements of the BHCA by ensuring that the institutions
under their control did not accept what would legally be considered
demand deposits.66
In 1970, Congress again amended the definition of     
institution . . . which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal
57

Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a), (c)(1) (applying the statute"s restrictions only to BHCs that
own banks that meet the statutory definition).
58
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 13839 (noting that Congress amended the
definition of a bank under the BHCA three times).
59
See H.R. REP. NO. 89-534, at 3 (1965) (stating the BHCA was not intended to
anticipate all possible problems).
60
See id. at 34 (closing the loophole for trust banks).
61
See, e.g., Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 15152 (discussing the growing
number of acquisitions of nonbank banks in the 1980s, exploiting a loophole in an older
version of the BHCA).
62
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 3, 80 Stat.
236, 236.
63
See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133,
133 (defining !bank" as any national banking association or any State bank, savings bank,
or trust company . . ).
64
S. REP. NO. 89-1179, at 7 (1966).
65
See id. (providing that the commonly accepted test for whether an institution is a
commercial bank is whether it accepts demand deposits).
66
See id. (maintaining that the 1966 Amendments opened the door to holding companies
that could control both commercial and de facto banking subsidiaries so long as these
entities did not take demand deposits).
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right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making
!$! %-67   &! ! $%&$&&  .%
application only to those institutions engaged in commercial and not
consumer lending.68 This change, in effect, allowed any company to obtain
control of an FDIC-insured institution that both accepted deposits and
made consumer loans without implicating the BHCA.69 This so-called
, !   -!!"!$")"$!$&( &&!" %!'
own banks without being subject to the restrictions of the BHCA.70
Viewing this trend as a major threat to the separation of banking and
commerce, Congress closed the nonbank bank loophole in the Competitive
#'&)    &, -! )  & &! !
bank to its current version:
(A) An insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. (B) An institution . . .
which both+(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that
the depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for
payment to third parties or others; and (ii) is engaged in
the business of making commercial loans.71
CEBA also included a number of exceptions from the definition of a
bank, specifically excluding foreign banks, trust banks, credit unions,
credit card banks, industrial loan companies (ILCs), and savings banks. 72
The exceptions to the definition of a bank under the BHCA shed light on
&%&&'&.%' $) "!y rationales, providing some guidance as to
when Congress will apply the BHCA to a particular type of entity.

  .%!)&! %
$!$&!&  .% & &    !$$&!"$!&&%
community banks, a number of states imposed r%&$&! % !   %.
abilities to expand across state borders.73 In response, several entities
began to form BHCs because it enabled them to own banks from different
67

Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(c), 84
Stat. 1760, 1760.
68
See S. REP. NO. 91-1084, at 24 (1970) (discussing the Board.s concerns that the 1966
Amendments made the definition of a bank too broad).
69
See S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 2 (1987) (discussing the rise of the nonbank bank loophole).
70
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 150 (expanding upon the creation of the
nonbank bank loophole).
71
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(a), 101 Stat.
552, 554; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1).
72
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 101(a); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2).
73
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 120*21 (discussing the interstate banking
rationale).
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states while avoiding restrictions on interstate banking.74 States and local
bankers grew concerned that the growing number of BHCs threatened the
ability of community banks to operate in the commercial credit market.75
The BHCA was thus born from the two harmonious policy rationales of
(1) restricting interstate banking and (2) preventing excessive
concentration of commercial credit.76 Nevertheless, market and economic
realities made these two objectives less feasible.77 Interstate banking
restrictions simply fell out of favor while resistance to the monopolization
of commercial credit faded as more banks consolidated and merged with
        . . . economies of scale . . . 78 Instead,
policymakers grew more concerned with the intermingling of banking and
commerce.79
Separating banking and commerce has been a long-standing principle
of U.S. financial regulation, and it has evolved over time.80 Beginning in
the 1860s, the National Bank Act of 1864 provided for a limited set of core
banking powers.81 The separation of banking and commerce was then
formally codified into law with the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which
limited the activities that banks could engage in, specifically prohibiting
banks from dealing in or underwriting securities.82 However, banks were
74

Id. at 121.
Id. at 122 (noting that the BHCA was the result of lobbying efforts by smaller local
banks).
76
Id. at 120.
77
Id. at 123 n.33 (analyzing the historical and economic developments that lessened the
importance of restricting expansions into interstate banking).
78
Id. at 12324 (detailing the wave of bank mergers, acquisitions, and consolidations
that occurred throughout the latter half of the 20th century).
79
Id. at 124 (citing PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 4:03 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2nd ed., 2011)) (Soon after 1956, the main focus of BHC regulation gradually
began shifting away from its original emphasis on prevention of undue concentration of
commercial bank credit toward the issue of separation of banking and commerce.).
80
See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Amazons Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 794 (2017)
(noting the historical significance of the separation of banking and commerce in banking
law). See generally Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce
Reconsidered, 13 J. CORP. L. 481 (providing a history of the separation of banking and
commerce in the United States).
81
See Halpert, supra note 80, at 492 (noting the powers granted to banks by the National
Bank Act were limited in scope); see also 12 U.S.C § 24(Seventh) (containing a onesentence description of the powers of banks that states: all such incidental powers as shall
be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by receiving
deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal
security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes . . ).
82
See WILLIAM D. JACKSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NO. 87-352 E, GLASS-STEAGALL ACT:
COMMERCIAL V. INVESTMENT BANKING 2 (1987) (discussing the purpose and enactment of
the Glass-Steagall Act, which was to counteract the risky intermingling of commercial
75
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still permitted to affiliate with purely commercial firms.83 The most
meaningful change came in 1956 with the BHCA, which finally imposed
restrictions on the activities of bank affiliates.84
There are three main arguments in favor of maintaining the separation
"    '   erve the safety and
soundness of insured depository institutions, to ensure a fair and efficient
flow of credit to productive economic enterprise, and to prevent excessive
"(85
The safety   ")# 
risky nonbanking activities as both banks and the deposit insurance fund
(for depository banks) should not be used to prop-up failing commercial
affiliates.86 The second argument pertains to bias in credit underwriting,
"$$!%'
 )
    ) cial condition or
$(87 Lastly, the third prong relates to the potential for banks
and commercial firms to merge and form large financial conglomerates to
the exclusion of small businesses and businesses not affiliated with a
bank.88
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-$' (
which both partially repealed Glass-Steagall and created a new financial
$$'
(89 FHCs are able to engage
!' (
'$(!$90 While the GLBA did not
outright repeal the separation of banking and commerce, it did make it

banking and securities dealing that was a contributing factor to the financial meltdown that
precipitated the Great Depression).
83
Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 274 (2013).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 275.
86
See id. at 275&76 (discussing the problems with allowing commercial businesses to
benefit from the deposit insurance fund through their bank affiliates).
87
Id. at 276; see also S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 8 (1987) (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman
Paul Volcker) ('Suppose the local appliance dealer comes in to ask for loans from a bank
run by a large retail chain. I suspect the branch manager isn)t going to be very happy to
provide the money . . . .If he does [make the loans], I suspect he is going to find himself
selling shoes . . . before long.().
88
See Omarova, supra note 83, at 276&77.
89
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999); see also
Omarova, supra note 83, at 279 (discussing the GLBA).
90
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1).
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significantly easier for companies to own a bank while also owning other
nonbank entities.91

III. ANALYZING THE FINTECH CHARTER AND THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE BHCA
The OCC FinTech charter specifically requires that marketplace
lenders not take deposits, yet allows them to avail themselves of all the
rights and benefits of becoming a national bank.92 Because of this, the
FinTech charter is highly desirable for marketplace lenders seeking greater
regulatory clarity and certainty, particularly because of the federal
preemption benefits.93 Throughout the history of the BHCA, numerous
entities have sought to take advantage of the BHC structure without
triggering the statute and thus being subject to enhanced regulation by the
Board.94 This demonstrates that the BHC structure itself is highly desirable
as it enables companies to consolidate.95 But, as the BHCA is currently
written, it would not apply to the parent company of a marketplace lender
because the marketplace lender would not meet the statutory definition of
a bank.96                   
policy rationales demonstrates that the BHCA should apply to the parent
companies of chartered FinTech SPNBs because doing so would serve
those rationales.97

91

See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 126 (contending that the principle of the
separation of banking and commerce was retained by a last minute amendment to the
GLBA).
92
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that
depository institutions would not qualify for the FinTech charter); see also OFF. OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that SPNBs are subject to the
same laws and standards as chartered national banks and that a FinTech SPNB would have
the same rights as any other nationally-chartered bank).
93
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that
SPNBs would be able to avail themselves of the preemption benefits available to chartered
national banks under the National Bank Act and the OCCs regulations).
94
See generally Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8 (providing a history of the definition
of a bank under the BHCA, which evolved in response to companies seeking to become
BHCs without being regulated as such under the statute).
95
See id. at 12324 (discussing the trend among banks and their holding companies to
merge, acquire, and consolidate in order to take advantage of the benefits that a large
financial conglomerate has to offer).
96
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 11 (noting marketplace lenders do not take deposits
and instead rely on other sources of funding); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2018)
(defining a bank as an institution that takes demand deposits).
97
See generally Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8 (discussing the changing definition
of a bank under the BHCA pursuant to the underlying policy rationales).
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A. Proposing a BHCA Analysis Framework
Let us return to the case of FastCash, Inc., our hypothetical
marketplace lender that is now a charted SPNB. Recall that Abracadabra,
Inc., a technology and e-commerce company, is seeking to acquire
FastCash in order to offer lending services to its customers and, in doing
so, it would not be subject to the requirements under the BHCA. But,
should it be?
The underlying rationales for the BHCA helped guide Congress when
determining whether an entity should be considered a bank under the
statute.98 These policy rationales can be used as a framework to analyze
whether companies like Abracadabra should be subject to the
requirements of the BHCA by including marketplace lenders, such as
FastCash, in the definition of a bank.99 The first part of the analysis
framework encompasses the three explicit underlying policy rationales
that emerged throughout the history of the BHCA: (1) restricting interstate
banking; (2) preventing the monopolization of commercial credit; and (3)
separating banking and commerce.100 The second part of the analysis
framework proposes three new rationales that were implicit in the policy
          
of a parallel regulatory regime; (2) access to the federal safety net; and (3)
mitigating too-big-to-fail institutions.101

i. Framework Part I: Explicit Rationales for the BHCA
Over time, restricting interstate banking and preventing the excessive
concentration of commercial credit faded away as the primary policy
objectives of the BHCA because the economic realities of the financial
industry had changed.102 Congress ultimately repealed the restrictions on
interstate banking under the BHCA in 1994, finding the provision no
98

See generally id. (providing a history of the evolution of the BHCA due to underlying
policy rationales).
99
See generally id. (demonstrating how Congress created the definition of a bank and
the exemptions from the definition of a bank based on whether doing so served the
underlying policy rationales).
100
See id. at 119 (prevention of excessive concentration of commercial credit and the
separation of banking and commerce); see also id. at 120 (restricting geographic expansion
of large banking groups and to prevent excessive concentration in the commercial banking
industry).
101
See id. at 190 (parallel regulatory regime); see also id. at 15152 (pointing out that
commercial companies who acquire banks also acquire cheap funding from the bank s
depositors because the deposits are insured by the federal government); id. at 127
(discussing how, under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010, nonbank systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are regulated
similarly to BHCs)
102
See id. at 12223 (examining how these two rationales became less relevant).
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longer useful.103 In 1987, CEBA further eroded the restrictions against
interstate banking by codifying an explicit federal preemption of state
interstate banking laws.104 However, preventing the excessive
concentration of commercial credit remains a viable, though not central,
objective of the BHCA.105 This is seen in the definition of a bank in the
statute itself, which includes entities that take demand deposits and make
commercial loans, demonstrating a focus on commercial credit as opposed
to consumer credit.106 In addition, CEBA created an exemption from the
definition of a bank for trust companies, but specifically restricted them
from making commercial loans.107 Although restricting interstate banking
is not as essential when balancing the various policy rationales supporting
the applicability of the BHCA, preventing the excessive concentration of
commercial credit remains relevant.108
The importance of these latter two policy rationales pales in
comparison to the third policy rationale: separating banking and
commerce.109 Recall the three reasons Congress chose to separate banking
                     
affiliations with risky, purely-commercial businesses; (2) preventing bias
in credit decisions causing banks to prop-up their failing commercial
affiliates to the detriment of other potential borrowers; and (3)
103

See id. at 123 n.33 (discussing the development and eventual repeal of the Douglas
Amendment and explaining why the restrictions on interstate banking fell out of favor).
104
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 172 (1987) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining the rationale for
preempting state laws restricting interstate banking as important for bank acquisitions).
105
See generally id. (retaining provisions of the BHCA that protect against the
monopolization of commercial credit).
106
See id. at 11920 (closing the nonbank bank loophole but maintaining commercial
loans as a key feature of a bank); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (current statutory
definition of a bank).
107
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(a), 101 Stat.
552, 554; see H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 120.
108
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 172 (noting CEBA also exempted credit
card banks from the statutory definition of a bank because these entities were not engaged
in commercial lending); see also id. at 178 (discussing the credit union exemption, which
was justified on the basis that credit unions did not impact the commercial credit market);
id. at 190 (emphasizing Congress concerns about the excessive concentration of
commercial credit).
109
See generally Omarova, supra note 83 (providing a thorough discussion of the history
and importance of separating banking and commerce in U.S. financial regulation and
providing recent examples that demonstrate the conflicts of interest that arise from
allowing financial institutions to deal in commodities); Khan, supra note 80 (analogizing
the separation of banking and commerce to antitrust law and explaining why Amazon poses
similar risks to the economy as banks who affiliate with purely commercial businesses);
Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV. 973
(2019) (emphasizing the importance of separation regimes in other industries, including
banking).
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discouraging the formation of large financial conglomerates.110 While
these reasons illuminate why the separation of banking and commerce is a
priority, the history of the BHCA also demonstrates how that separation is
continuously undermined by companies seeking to exploit loopholes and
gain the benefits of owning a bank.111
An ILC, one of the entities excepted from the definition of a bank, is
a good example of what happens when an entity is exempt from
application of the BHCA.112 In 2005, there was significant controversy
when Wal-Mart attempted to form its own ILC in order to offer financial
services to its customers.113 Realizing the implications for the separation
of banking and commerce, the FDIC subsequently imposed a moratorium
on Wal- 
               
applications by commercial firms seeking ILCs.114 Despite this, ILCs
continue to benefit from exemption status under the BHCA, and the
popularity of an ILC charter has not abated.115 Some have speculated that
Big Tech companies, such as Google, Amazon, and Apple, will apply for
an ILC charter sometime soon, posing a direct threat to the separation of
banking and commerce.116
Congress appears to have legitimate reasons for wanting separate
banking and commerce, despite disagreement among legal scholars,
policymakers, and regulators as to whether doing so is still a worthwhile

110

See Omarova, supra note 83, at 27576.
Cf. JACKSON, supra note 82, at 1314 (discussing the benefits of allowing banks to
diversify by affiliating with commercial businesses).
112
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 160 (discussing the ILC exemption to the
definition of a bank under the BHCA).
113
See id. at 168 (providing a history of Wal-Marts attempt to obtain an ILC).
114
See id. (discussing the FDICs moratorium on Wal-Marts application for deposit
insurance and the related fallout); see also Scott Coleman & James Kim, FDIC Issues
Proposed Rule for Approval of ILC Deposit Insurance Applications, JD SUPRA (Mar. 25,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fdic-issues-proposed-rule-for-approval86042/ (discussing the process by which ILCs apply for a charter under the relevant state
authorities and subsequently apply for deposit insurance with the FDIC).
115
See generally DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11374, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
COMPANIES AND FINTECH IN BANKING (2019) (analyzing the increasing popularity of ILC
charters among technology companies and the implications for the separation of banking
and commerce).
116
See id. at 2 ([O]bservers have speculated that technology giants such as Google,
Amazon, and Apple might have reason to want a bank charter, possibly including an ILC,
in the near future.).
111
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goal.117 In reality, these threats create significant conflicts of interest.118 A
recent example from the early 2010s in which Goldman Sachs utilized its
commodities and derivatives businesses to profit from its own
manipulation of aluminum prices underscores the importance of
maintaining the separation between banking and commerce even in
modern times.119 Returning to our hypothetical marketplace lender,
FastCash, and Abracadabra, such an acquisition mirrors the more recent
trend of Big Tech entering financial services; thus, the separation of
banking and commerce should factor heavily into the analysis
framework.120

ii. Framework Part II: Proposed Rationales
           
applicability emerged as both the market and regulatory environment
changed, particularly following the financial crisis of 2008.121 The earliest
exemptions to the definition of a bank under the BHCA were carved out
for credit unions and savings and loan as    122
Congress did not view these entities as banks for the purposes of the
117

Compare Mehrsa Baradaran, Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 385, 40001 (2012) (arguing financial regulators
should adjust to the current structure of the market rather than pushing for the separation
of banking and commerce), and Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 322 (1987) (highlighting the benefits of allowing
banks to diversify their assets), and Peter J. Wallison, Why Are We Still Separating
Banking and Commerce?
AM. BANKER (Jul. 27, 2017, 9:30 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-are-we-still-separating-banking-andcommerce (explaining that enabling banks to affiliate with nonbank entities has certain
benefits such as diversification, enhanced risk tolerance, increased efficiency, and
opportunities for capital expansion), with Thomas E. Wilson, Separation Between Banking
and Commerce Under the Bank Holding Company Act -- A Statutory Objective Under
Attack, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 184 (1983) (contending that the separation of banking and
commerce should be strengthened as an essential ingredient of a sound banking system
and to suppress the rise of nonbank banks).
118
See Omarova, supra note 83, at 276 (listing the potential conflicts of interest that
would arise from an intermingling of banking and commerce); see also Khan, supra note
109, at 1053 (stating bias as the drive behind separating banking and commerce).
119

See generally Omarova, supra note 83 (providing a detailed history and analysis of
Goldman Sachs commodities business and the consequences).
120
See BIS, ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 60 (2019) (noting the trend among Big Tech
companies, including e-commerce platforms, to offer lending services to their customers).
121
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 190 (tracking the changing policy
rationales for the BHCA since CEBA in response to the financial crisis and the enactment
of Dodd-Frank).
122
See id. at 174 (discussing the credit union exemption); see also id. at 179 (discussing
the exemption for savings associations).
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BHCA, so the companies that seek to acquire them need not abide by the
"##$#+"! $!#"!'!!%'# !123 Though not
explicitly stated, the rationale for these exemptions was, in part, due to the
existence of a parallel regulatory regime.124 Credit unions are regulated
"$!%"'# # !# "#!#)  *
and thrift holding companies are regulated by the OCC (though, when the
exemption was created, thrift holding companies were regulated by the
!#$!%")*125 When considering whether our
hypothetical marketplace lender, FastCash, should fall under the definition
of a bank under the BHCA, we may also consider whether it is subject to
a parallel federal regulatory regime.126
Another implicit rationale for the applicability of the BHCA has to do
with access to the federal safety net, i.e., deposit insurance.127 This
rationale can be thought of as an offshoot of the separation of banking and
commerce.128 Policymakers supported separating banking and commerce
out of concerns that access to deposit insurance by commercial businesses
would give them an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that
have not acquired a deposit-taking bank.129 Part of the reason for closing
#       &" # !%# )!# "" #
federally-insured retail deposits that served as a cheaper source of
financing because of the public subs'*130 While access to such valuable
funding is permissible for banks, who provide a public service, it is less
necessary for commercial firms who are expected to rely on market forces
123

See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2) (codifying exemptions to the definition of a bank in the
BHCA).
124
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 190 (pointing out the parallel regulatory
regime for credit unions and the parallel regulatory regime for thrifts).
125
See id. at 187 (explaining that Dodd-Frank altered the regulatory regime for thrifts by
dissolving OTS and transferring authority to the OCC).
126
See id. at 190.
127
See id. at 152 (elaborating on the vulnerability of the federal safety net if purely
commercial businesses were allowed to affiliate with banks).
128
See Omarova, supra note 83, at 275(76 (expanding upon the risks posed to the deposit
insurance fund by purely commercial businesses in the context of discussing the underlying
reasons for separating banking and commerce).
129
See S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 7 (1987) (reporting that failing to close the nonbank bank
loophole would undermine the separation of banking and commerce and undermine market
competition); id. at 8 ()The nonbank bank loophole allows commercial firms that own
nonbanks to gain an unfair competitive advantage over bank holding companies and over
commercial firms that do not have captive nonbank banks.*); cf. JACKSON, supra note 82,
at 14 (making the case against allowing the intermingling of banking and commerce
because giving businesses access to cheap funding and )not funds obtained at higher
competitive costs in less-regulated capital and credit markets* is generally anticompetitive).
130
Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 152; see also S. REP. NO. 100-19 at 8
(discussing Congress+ reasoning for closing the nonbank bank loophole).
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for both funding and competition.131 We may also ask, therefore, whether
our marketplace lender FastCash has access to the federal safety net such
that it would give Abracadabra an unfair competitive advantage over other
commercial firms.132
Lastly, a more recent rationale has emerged following the financial
crisis of 2008 and enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010: safeguarding firms that are too big to
fail.133 Dodd-Frank revolutionized financial stability regulation with the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), whose
ability to designate nonbank systemically important financial institutions
!
"    
is, oversight over nonbank institutions institutions with no banking
subsidiaries such as insurance companies.134 Under Dodd-Frank, firms
designated as SIFIs by FSOC are subject to enhanced regulation by the
Board and must maintain certain capital thresholds, among other
requirements.135 While the FSOC regime is separate and apart from the
BHCA, it adopts a similar framework and applies it to firms designated as
SIFIs.136 It is notable that Congress viewed safeguarding too-big-to-fail
financial conglomerates as a key policy objective underlying a BHCA-like
regulatory regime.137
The concept behind the FSOC designation process was that financial
firms could become so large that they pose a systemic risk to the entire
financial system such that their failure is not an option (thus the moniker
!-big-to- "138 FSOC initially showed promise, with some legal
131

See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 152 n.146 (stating that because of deposit
insurance, U.S. banks receive !a significant public subsidy," but this is because !they
perform important public utility functions"); PERKINS, supra note 14, at 4, 56 (illustrating
and explaining the funding sources for marketplace lenders, who do not take deposits).
132
See, e.g., id. (discussing the implications of access to deposit insurance for
commercial businesses who partner with depository institutions).
133
See id. at 191 (noting how the Dodd-Frank financial stability regime functions as a
backstop to the BHCA for firms not covered under the statute).
134
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 111, 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392, 1398 (establishing FSOC and vesting it with the
authority to subject nonbank institutions to enhanced supervision and prudential regulation
by the Board); see Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 127 (explaining Dodd-Frank#s
applicability to firms designated as SIFIs, even ones that do not own a bank, and how they
would become subject to supervision and regulation by the Board much like BHCs).
135
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 115.
136
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 127 (contending that Dodd-Frank
essentially adopted the BHCA regulatory regime and applied it to firms designated as
SIFIs).
137
See id. (noting the financial crisis made the once !obsolete" BHCA relevant again).
138
See DAVID W. PERKINS ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45518, BANKING POLICY ISSUES
IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019) (discussing the concept of too-big-to-fail, stemming
from the financial crisis of 20072009).
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scholars positing that the new financial stability regime would make a
strong BHCA less necessary.139 In other words, a BHC that is not subject
to the BHCA due to the fact that it controls an exempt entity could still be
subject to oversight by the Board if it is designated as a SIFI. 140 Others
questioned the effectiveness of Dodd-  big-to-fail institutions.141 Nevertheless, Dodd-    
regime has since been rolled back. The Economic Growth, Regulatory
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 raised the threshold for SIFI
designation from $50 billion to $250 billion in assets. 142 Additionally,
               
designation guidelines that would make it harder to designate too-big-tofail institutions as SIFIs.143 Accepting the premise that FSOC would serve
139
See, e.g., Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 191 (arguing that the debate over the
BHCAs applicability will be much less vital following Dodd-Frank and pointing out that
the FSOC regime can also serve the same policy rationales that underlie the BHCA). But
see Hilary J. Allen, Putting the Financial Stability in Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 76 OHIO STATE L.J. 1087, 1091 (2015) (arguing that the effectiveness of FSOC
has been questionable owing to the need for a restructuring, explaining that FSOCs
member agencies have only nebulous responsibility for financial stability concerns, and
this responsibility is easily shirked when the economy is booming and regulatory
intervention has become unpalatable).
140
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 191 (making the point that a company not
covered by the BHCA could still be subject to supervision by the Board in a BHCA-like
manner under Dodd-Frank).
141
See Thomas W. Joo, Lehman 10 Years Later: The Dodd-Frank Rollback, 50 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 561, 59596 (2019) (stating that FSOC had withered under the Trump
Administration owing to the administrations deregulatory agenda and that [i]n 2013 and
2014, the FSOC identified four companies [as SIFIs], but [t]here are now no more nonbank financial companies with this designation). See generally Allen, supra note 139
(discussing the risks and inadequacies of an ex post approach to financial stability and
financial crises, criticizing Dodd-Frank and FSOC); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank
Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV.
951 (2011) (discussing the shortcomings of Dodd-Franks approach to too-big-to-fail and
the SIFI designation process).
142
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115174, § 401, 132 Stat. 1296, 1356 (2018); see also Joo, supra note 141, at 568 (discussing
the changes that the 2018 legislation made to Dodd-Frank and FSOCs SIFI designation
process).
143
Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 84 Fed. Reg. 71,740, 71,760 (Dec. 30, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1310); see also John W. Banes et al., FSOC Shift to an Activities-Based Approach Signals
an Emphasis on the Risks to Financial Stability from Digital Transformation, DAVIS POLK
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2020-01-15_fsoc_shift_to_activitiesbased_approach_signals_emphasis_on_risks_from_digital_transformation.pdf
(summarizing the changes to the SIFI designation process under the 2019 guidance). It
should be noted that the 2019 FSOC guidance is a potential target for rollback by the Biden
Administration. See Gregg Gelzinis, 5 Priorities for the Financial Stability Oversight
(Mar. 31, 2021, 12:01 AM),
Council,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
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to complement the BHCAand recognizing that there are no presently
designated SIFIsit appears that the BHCA will have to assume the role
of safeguarding too-big-to-fail institutions going forward.144

B. Applying the Framework: Marketplace Lending
Having established a framework by which to analyze whether
marketplace lenders should qualify as banks under the BHCA, we can now
apply that framework to our hypothetical marketplace lender, FastCash.
The first rationalerestricting interstate bankinghas faded away from
   145 Nonetheless, even if we were to consider whether
defining FastCash as a bank under the BHCA would serve this rationale,
FastCash offers lending services to its customers via an online platform
only and does not have any branch locations.146 Even if Congress retained
restricting interstate banking as a key policy objective for the BHCA,
applying the definition of a bank to FastCash would not serve this
rationale.147
The second rationale, preventing the monopolization of commercial
credit, stemmed from concerns by community bankers that they would be
pushed out of the market by larger banking entities.148 While it remains a
valid policy goal for the BHCA, the reality of the financial industry is that
most banks have consolidated to form large financial conglomerates,
hoarding a significant percentage of the commercial credit market.149 Our
hypothetical marketplace lender FastCash makes consumer loans only,
and the concentration of consumer credit was not an issue that Congress

https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2021/03/31/497439/5priorities-financial-stability-oversight-council/.
144
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 191 (discussing the potential for FSOC to
fill the shoes of the BHCA when it comes to too-big-to-fail institutions); see also John
Heltman, Prudential, the Last Nonbank SIFI, Sheds the Label, AM. BANKER (Oct. 17, 2018,
9:08 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/prudential-the-last-nonbank-sifisheds-the-label (reporting on FSOCs decision to remove Prudentials SIFI designation,
which was the last remaining SIFI).
145
Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 12223 ([S]afeguarding interstate banking
restrictions faded away as the primary policy purpose behind the BHCA.).
146
See, e.g., PERKINS, supra note 14, at 1 (describing marketplace lenders as online
entities that do not provide services via a physical location).
147
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 122 (explaining that the restrictions in the
BHCA against interstate banking arose as a result of banks forming BHC to avoid state
laws in interstate branching).
148
See id. (characterizing small independent and community bankers as the main thrust
behind the BHCA due to fears of being overrun by large interstate banks).
149
See id. at 124 (describing the allocation of commercial credit among large financial
institutions versus small and medium-sized banks).
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was concerned about.150 But, say for example that FastCash wanted to
expand into small business lending. 151   '      
business lending market would likely be relatively minor compared to the
total amount of commercial credit.152 However, small business credit
origination by marketplace lenders is growing rapidly, and there is reason
to assume that FastCash will be competitive with other commercial lenders
in the future.153  ##      '  
FastCash could pose a risk to the concentration of commercial credit given
that Abracadabra, a large e-commerce technology company, holds a
substantial share of the market in the retail industry and thus has a large
customer base.154
We now turn to the question of whether defining FastCash as a bank
under the BHCA would serve the separation of banking and commerce.155
The first prong of this rationale pertains to safety and soundness,
 # "        
  % !   
   !&156 It is unlikely that a small
lender such as FastCash, even if acquired by a larger company like
Abracadabra, would face #      ' 
businesses.157 "!      '         
problems that might affect both its retail customers and lending
customers.158 Therefore, it would seem defining FastCash as a bank under
the BHCA would serve the safety and soundness prong. The second prong
pertains to bias in credit underwriting, particularly whether FastCash
would be more inclined to lend to Abracadabra to prop-up its failing
150

H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 2 (1955) (%There has developed in this country . . . a
conception of the independent unit bank as an institution having its ownership and origin
in the local community and deriving its business chiefly from the community's industrial
and commercial activities . . . .The bank holding company device threatens to destroy this
democratic grassroots institution.&); see Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 148
(explaining Congress' focus on commercial loans as opposed to consumer loans).
151
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 5 (describing the commercial lending activities of
marketplace lenders).
152
See id. (providing statistics on marketplace lenders' consumer and small business
lending portfolios, noting that marketplace lenders %accounted for less than 1% of the total
consumer and small-business loan market&).
153
See id. (emphasizing that marketplace lending is growing at a fast pace and noting the
industry saw an increase of 163% in credit originations between 2011 and 2015).
154
See, e.g., Khan, supra note 80, at 795 (analogizing the risks posed by Amazon in the
antitrust sense to the intermingling of banking and commerce).
155
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 123$24 (discussing the separation of
banking and commerce).
156
Khan, supra note 80, at 795.
157
See id. at 795$96 (suggesting that Amazon's expansion into financial services is
unlikely to pose excessive financial risks).
158
See id. at 796 (using the 2013 Target hack as an example of the threat that large
retailers pose because of their access to scores of consumer data).
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nonbanking businesses.159 It would be very difficult to predict whether
FastCash would be a good actor and conduct transactions with its affiliates
at arms-length, but it is safe to assume that bias is a possibility. 160 Lastly,
the third prong relates to the potential for Abracadabra to form a large
financial conglomerate.161 This is similarly difficult to predict but,
nonetheless, a possibility.162 It is important to note the growing trend
among Big Tech companies to expand into financial services.163   
Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Applehold a large share of the
market and thus have a large consumer base.164 Even though it is unclear
whether this prong is satisfied, there is a sufficient possibility that the
acquisition of marketplace lenders will form large financial conglomerates
that subjecting FastCash to the definition of bank would seem to serve all
three prongs and, therefore, the separation of banking and commerce.165
Having discussed the explicit policy rationales, there appears to be a
case for subjecting FastCash to the definition of a bank under the
BHCA.166 There remain, however, the proposed implicit rationales, which
           167 The
first implicit rationale is the existence, or lack thereof, of a parallel

159

See Omarova, supra note 83, at 276 (discussing bias as an issue with failing to separate
banking and commerce).
160
See Khan, supra note 80, at 795 (Allowing a vertically integrated dominant platform
[such as Amazon] to pick and choose to whom it makes its services available, and on what
terms, has the potential to distort fair competition and the economy as a whole.).
161
See Omarova, supra note 83, at 27677 (examining the risks of an excessive
concentration of economic power).
162
See Khan, supra note 80, at 79697 (using Amazon as an example to suggest that
allowing such companies to combine various lines of business could create an excessive
concentration of economic power).
163
See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Big Techs Invasion of Banking, MILKEN INST. (Apr. 26, 2019),
https://www.milkenreview.org/articles/big-techs-invasion-of-banking
(noting
that
commercial firms, such as Amazon, Google, Alibaba and Tencent, are entering the
financial services world, threatening antitrust principles and the separation of banking and
commerce, particularly because these companies have a large cache of resources and data).
164
See id. ([I]n light of its deep pockets and unprecedented access to data, big tech could
prove the greater threat.).
165
See Khan, supra note 80, at 79697 (discussing the risks of consolidating economic
power).
166
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 119 (emphasizing the relevance of the
BHCAs underlying policy rationales); id. at 120 (stating that the BHCAs policy rationales
have evolved over time as a result of changing conditions); id. (reiterating restricting
interstate banking and the excessive concentration of commercial credit as underlying
policy rationales for the BHCA).
167
See id. at 190 (parallel regulatory regime); id. at 15152 (pointing out that commercial
companies who acquire banks also acquire cheap funding backed by depositors); id. at 127
(discussing how, under the Dodd-Frank Act, nonbank SIFIs are regulated similarly to
BHCs).
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regulatory regime.168 The credit union and thrift exemptions to the
statutory definition of a bank are notable given that credit unions were
already regulated by the NCUA, while thrifts were already regulated by
OTS, and subsequently the OCC.169 With marketplace lenders, there is no
parallel regulatory regime at the national level.170 Marketplace lenders are
primarily regulated by the states and may be regulated by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to the extent that consumer protection
statutes are implicated.171 This tilts the balance in favor of including
marketplace lenders in the statutory definition of a bank.172
However, recall that our hypothetical marketplace lender FastCash has
received an SPNB charter from the OCC.173 Therefore, a parallel
regulatory regime would exist for FastCash at the federal level, but this is
hardly dispositive.174 If being subject to regulation by the OCC weighed
against BHCA applicability, then there would be no BHCA to begin with.
This is because the OCC has primary regulatory authority for all chartered
national banks.175 The fact that FastCash as a SPNB would be regulated
by the primary federal banking regulator does not mean that the BHCA
should not apply.176 As a result, analyzing the parallel regulatory structure
suggests that FastCash should be subject to the statutory definition of a
bank.177
The next implicit policy rationale pertains to whether FastCash has
access to the federal safety net; specifically, whether Abracadabra would
have access to funding subsidized by the public, obtaining an unfair

168

See id. at 178, 190 (existence of a parallel regulatory regime for thrifts and credit
unions).
169
See id. at 187 (explaining that Dodd-Frank altered the regulatory regime for thrifts by
dissolving OTS and transferring authority to the OCC).
170
See PERKINS, supra note 14, at 12 (outlining the regulatory framework for the
marketplace lending industry).
171
See id. at 1415 (discussing the consumer protection statutes that apply to marketplace
lending).
172
See id. at 1617 (discussing the burdensome state regulatory system and lack of a
national regulatory regime for marketplace lenders).
173
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 1, at 4 (discussing how
FinTech SPNBs would be regulated by the OCC as national banks).
174
See id. at 6 (The OCC is the primary prudential regulator and supervisor of national
banks.).
175
Id.
176
See id. at 7 (acknowledging that national banks could be subject to regulation under
the BHCA if the bank meets the statutory definition).
177
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 186 n.327 (citing H.R. 10 - The Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999 Hearings before the Comm. on Banking and Financial
Servs., 106th Cong. 42-43 (1999) (statement of R. Scott Jones, President, American
Bankers Association)).
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competitive advantage.178 This rationale need not be discussed further
because subjecting FastCash to the BHCA clearly would not serve to
protect the federal safety net.179 FastCash does not engage in any deposittaking business nor would it be able to because FinTech SPNBs are not
permitted to take deposits.180 Without any insured deposits, FastCash and
its acquisition by Abracadabra pose no threat to the federal safety net.181
There appears to be a case in favor of subjecting FastCash to the
statutory definition of a bank as doing so would serve the following three
rationales: (1) preventing the monopolization of commercial credit; (2)
separation of banking and commerce; and (3) availability of a parallel
regulatory regime. The last rationale to consider is whether applying the
statutory definition of a bank to FastCash would safeguard FastCash and
its parent company as too-big-too-fail.182
Because it is near impossible to predict with certainty whether
Abracadabra will become too-big-to-fail, the primary argument weighing
in favor of defining FastCash as a bank under the BHCA is the fact that
the Dodd-Frank regime is no longer a fallback.183 In the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress created FSOC with the intention of regulating large firms posing
a systemic financial risk to the markets.184 Initially, it was unclear how
effective FSOC would be, but it was suggested that the exemptions from
the BHCA definition of a bank would become less important in favor of
the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.185 Because that has not happened, and

178

See id. at 152 (explaining that the issue with nonbank banks was that there access to
the federal safety net, giving them an unfair competitive advantage).
179
See id. at 150 (noting that nonbank banks accepted insured deposits, which exposed
the federal safety net to risk).
180
See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 2 (prohibiting
depository institutions from applying for the FinTech charter).
181
Cf. Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 152 (pointing out that deposits serve as
cheap source of funding because they are insured and backed by federal dollars).
182
See id. at 191 (discussing the relevance of the FSOC regime to the BHCA).
183
See Joo, supra note 141, at 568 (detailing how the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime and
SIFI designation process have been rolled back under the Trump Administration); see also
Banes, supra note 143, at 3 (describing how the FSOC designation process has changed
pursuant to the 2019 guidance).
184
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010) (providing that the purpose of FSOC would be to
prevent a recurrence or mitigate the impact of financial crises that could cripple financial
markets and damage the economy and to require nonbank financial companies to be
supervised by the Federal Reserve if their failure would pose a risk to U.S. financial
stability); see Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 129 (discussing the BHCA-like
regulatory regime that was enacted following the financial crisis).
185
See Omarova & Margaret, supra note 8, at 129 (noting that the success of DoddFranks changes on financial stability and the regulation of too-big-to-fail institutions had
not yet come to fruition); id. at 191 (arguing that the distinctions in the definition of a bank
under the BHCA matter less following the passage of Dodd-Frank because this new
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the future of the Dodd-Frank regime remains uncertain, this weighs in
favor of applying the statutory definition of a bank to FastCash and
subjecting Abracadabra to the enhanced regulations of the BHCA.186

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLYING THE BHCA TO FINTECH
SPNBS
Given that the BHCA does not currently apply to FinTech SPNBs and
having concluded that it should, this Comment recommends that Congress
amend Section 2(c) of the BHCA to include FinTech SPNBs in the
definition of a bank.187 Firstly, it must be noted that the OCC FinTech
charter is still being litigated, and no FinTech company has yet applied for
the charter.188 There are two ways by which the FinTech charter can
become a legal certainty. On the one hand, the Second Circuit could
     
charter proposal would move forward.189 On the other hand, Congress
could amend the National Bank Act and give the OCC the specific
authority to charter FinTech SPNBs, similar to what it has done in the past
     190 Alternatively, however, it is
possible that the OCC neither wins its case nor receives authority from

systemic regulatory regime was serving the same rationales underlying the BHCA but with
broader applicability).
186
See id. at 191 (suggesting that the Dodd-Frank regulatory regime might make it less
likely that companies will try to avoid triggering the BHCA because of FSOCs designation
authority). But see Complaint at 1, Lacewell v. OCC, No. 18 Civ. 8377, 2019 WL 6334895,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019) (cautioning against enabling companies to obtain the
benefits of a national bank charter because it would make them more likely to be too-bigto-fail).
187
See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (setting out the seminal definition of a bank under the
BHCA).
188
Notice of Appeal, Lacewell, 2019 WL 6334895; see also Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 1, Lacewell, 2019 WL
6334895, (noting that the OCC has not yet received any applications for a FinTech charter).
As of March 2021, this appears to still be the case. See Oral Argument at 38:20, Lacewell
v.
OCC,
No.
19-04271
(2nd
Cir.
Dec.
19,
2019),
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c3e0d214-c94f-47df-a78e5f18f43d4a12/201-210/list/ (stating that there is no evidence in the record that the OCC
had received an application from a FinTech company to obtain an SPNB charter).
189
See Glenn G. Lammi, State vs. Federal Clash Over National Fintech Charter Set
For 2020 Appellate Showdown?, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2019, 1:04 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2019/11/14/state-vs-federal-clash-over-nationalfintech-charter-set-for-2020-appellate-showdown/#34e43868757d (contending that the
Second Circuit could uphold the OCC FinTech charter).
190
See 12 U.S.C. § 27 (giving the OCC the authority to charter trust banks and bankers
banks).
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Congress to charter FinTech SPNBs, and the potential for a FinTech
national bank disappears for the time being.191
 ( # FinTech companies as national
banks is valid, Congress should amend the BHCA in accordance with
previous iterations to include FinTech SPNBs in the statutory definition of
a bank.192 In 1982, Congress enacted the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act, which provides a framework that Congress can replicate
to apply the BHCA definition of a bank to FinTech SPNBs.193 Title IV of
the Garn-  % ( & 
   !%" # . . . by other dep#&
    %      # 
 #&194 Under the 1970 version of
  (       #   
bank.195 Consequently, in the Garn-St Germain Act, Congress amended
the BHCA to provide that:
  ' (             
banking association which is owned exclusively (except to the extent
(  #     # law) by other depository
institutions or by a bank holding company which is owned exclusively by
other depository institutions and is organized to engage exclusively in
providing services for other depository institutions and their officers,
directors, and employees.196
While this provision has been effectively repealed because it is no
longer necessary under the 1987 statutory definition of a bank, the GarnSt Germain Act provides a useful roadmap for how Congress can close the

191
See Sarah Grotta, Is This the End for the OCC Fintech Charter?, PAYMENTSJOURNAL
(Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.paymentsjournal.com/is-this-the-end-for-the-occ-fintechcharter/ (reporting on the OCC FinTech charter litigation). Alternatively, the Second
Circuit could dismiss the case for lack of ripeness, after which the OCC could begin
chartering FinTech companies. This would not resolve the underlying litigation on the
merits. See Oral Argument at 18:21, Lacewell v. OCC, No. 19-04271 (2nd Cir. Dec. 19,
2019),
https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c3e0d214-c94f-47df-a78e5f18f43d4a12/201-210/list/ (arguing that the case should be dismissed for lack of ripeness).
192
See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97$320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in sections of 12 U.S.C.) (subjecting bankers( banks to the
definition of a bank under the BHCA).
193
Id.
194
Id. (giving the OCC the authority to charter bankers( banks and amending the BHCA
to include bankers( banks in the definition of a bank); see 12 U.S.C. § 27 (codifying the
OCC(s authority charter bankers( banks and defining a bankers( bank).
195
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(c), 84
Stat. 1760, 1760 (1970).
196
§ 404(d), 96 Stat. 1469 at 1512.
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BHCA loophole in the OCC FinTech charter.197 This Comment
recommends that Congress append a subsection to Section 2(c)(1) of the
  " #  
as SPNBs pursuant to the OCC FinTech charter.198
The Garn-St Germain Act also exempte $   
requirement that every bank subsidiary of a holding company be an
      "  #199
With FinTech SPNBs who, by definition, do not and cannot take deposits,
the Garn-St Germain Act appears to be the optimal model for Congress to
subject companies with control over FinTech SPNBs to the requirements
of the BCHA without also implicating the requirements for deposit
insurance.200

V. CONCLUSION
As Big Tech makes its way into financial services, U.S. regulators will
need to grapple with the reality that the current legal framework is illequipped to deal with this entry. This Comment proposes an analysis
framework that is flexible and will necessarily evolve over time in order
to determine whether an entity should be subject to the requirements of the
     $     
that marketplace lenders should be included in the statutory definition of
a bank. Congress can do this by amending the definition under Section
2(c) of the BHCA to include SPNBs chartered pursuant to the OCC
FinTech charter. Doing so would ensure that Big Tech companies and
others could not use the charter as a form of regulatory arbitrage by
circumventing the enhanced requirements under the BHCA.

197

See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100!86, § 101, 101 Stat.
552, 554!564 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841) (replacing the statutory definition of a bank);
see also U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1).
198
See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (containing the statutory definition of a bank under the
BHCA).
199
§ 404(d)(2), 96 Stat. 1469 at 1512 (exempting bankers$ banks from BHCA deposit
insurance requirements).
200
See § 404, 96 Stat. 1469 at 1512 (amending the BHCA with respect to bankers$
banks).



